with explaining structural inertia. Population ecology contends that selection and fit are more satisfactory explanations of change than is adaptation Freeman, 1977, and Aldrich, 1979; Singh et al., 1986) . In particular, Freeman's (1977, 1984) structural inertia model asserts that the nature of selection processes is such that inert organizations are more likely to survive. With its focus on both internal and external change processes, their theory suggests that organizations favor stability. They emphasize the virtue of orthodoxy and routine as a means of responding to environmental changes. This view of survival centers on assumptions about the relative influence of populations, environment, and strategic choices on individual organizations.
While there are individual theoretical differences between ecologists, the one major agreement is that organizations rarely make spontaneous substantive adaptive structural changes, instead relying on selection and fit.
The basic theoretical argument in support of this stability thesis is that organizations with the ability to perform repeated tasks reliably have a better chance of survival (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991) . Performance reliability and accountability are high when organizational goals are institutionalized and patterns of organizational activity are routinized (Amburgey et al., 1993) .
Selection within organizational populations therefore tends to eliminate organizations with low reliability and low accountability. Together, these advantages require the selection of organizational structures that are reproducible or stable over time. High reproducibility in turn generates stronger inertial pressures, making organizations with high structural inertia more dominant in this selection process (Singh et al., 1986) . Institutionalization and routinization give an organization the comfort of reproducible structure (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982) .
Encapsulating this reasoning is an assertion that pressures within organizations promote organizations whose structures are characterized by high inertia. Consequently, changing certain features of the organization is viewed as lowering its performance reliability and accountability back to that of a new organization by destroying its competencies. To facilitate this argument, Freeman (1984, 1989 ) make the distinction between core and peripheral parts of organizational structure. They contend that change in an organization's core parts (its goals, forms of authority, technology, and marketing strategy) sets off reorganization processes that expose organizations to a high risk of mortality. In comparison, the potential for change in peripheral parts of structure tend to be weaker. Structural inertia theory suggests a tight coupling between core and peripheral parts. To facilitate this view, Hannan and Freeman and their supporters consider how the strength of inertial forces varies with the age, size, and complexity of an organization.
Supporting this inertia process, Denrell and March (2001) propose a competency trap suggesting that competitive selection pressures makes organizations prone to settle for suboptimal change. Using experiential learning and natural selection theory to support the point, they argue for a "hot stove effect" which asserts that there is a risk bias against change and in favor of stability. The pressure to reproduce successful alternatives progressively buffers individuals and organizations against perceived risky new alternatives. Similarly, Molinsky's (1999) study of change at a metropolitan hospital and a Fortune 50 corporation asserts that instead of changing the organization, planned changes to patient care delivery and division restructuring strengthened the status quo. Established processes, routines, and norms set the conditions so that "the sharp, bold edges of the [change] initiatives [were] sanded down by the strength and resiliency of the status quo system " (1999: 23) .
In a more specific test of Hannan and Freeman's original thesis, Stoeberl et al. (1998) replicate Delacroix and Swaminathan's (1991) findings in an examination of the Missouri wine industry. Concentrating on brand portfolio changes they find that larger wineries maintained reproducible structures to achieve high performance reliability and accountability, leading to structural inertia. Similarly, in a study of voluntary social service organizations in metropolitan Toronto, Singh et al. (1986) confirm Hannan and Freeman's core-periphery distinction. They highlight that ecological theory applies more to core properties of organizations undertaking change because the strength of inertial pressures is higher on core organizational features. Other confirmations of the various (age, size, routine, institutional) curvilinear effect of structural inertia theory include Amburgey et al.'s (1993) study of Finnish newspaper organizations, Barnett and Carroll's (1987) exploration of telephone companies, Kelly and Amburgey's (1991) review of the U.S. certified air carrier industry, and Rao and Neilson's (1992) and Haveman's (1992) studies of savings and loans organizations (for a comprehensive review of such support, see Baum and Shipilov, 2006) .
Challenging Structural Inertia
Despite confirming the principles of structural inertia theory, many of these same supportive studies point to organizations exhibiting both selective and adaptive change. This observation points to a rich vein of criticism of inertia theory. Quite apart from recognizing that inertia has historically been operationalized subjectively and abstractly, with limited empirical data (Miller and Chen, 1994) , most studies in support of an inertia thesis simultaneously indicate doubt or inconsistencies about its predictions. For example, in extending previous work, Haveman's (1993) study of savings and loans deregulation and Singh et al.'s (1991) continued review of voluntary social service organizations reveals weak evidence for both an age and size dependence in rates of change. Comparable findings are evident in studies testing Hannan and Freeman's history dependence (see Amburgey et al., 1993) and failure effects of change (see Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991) . For instance, Halliday et al. (1993) and Kelly and Amburgey (1991) illustrate that some organizations become more fluid rather than structurally inert with age.
Similarly, Delacroix and Swaminathan (1991) indicate that organizations do not necessarily fail as a result of their efforts to change. Together, such studies suggest that despite the centrality of inertia theory to ecological research, its benefits as an analytical tool and its outcomes as an organizational change device are clouded.
Key to this critique is that inertia debate is overwhelmingly premised on the study of external influences on organization. As part of a rejection of the population-ecology at the root of inertia theory, Donaldson (1995) presents an unyielding position in asserting the equivocal nature of most empirical tests of Hannan and Freeman's structural inertia propositions. In particular, he criticizes the narrowness of the ecological perspective that they deploy in delineating organizational survival. While Hannan and Freeman (1977) explicitly acknowledge that organizations face both internal and external constraints on their capacity to change, Donaldson suggests that neither Hannan and Freeman nor their supporters properly test this position.
Specifically, he disapproves the lack of explicit inclusion or acknowledgement of the internal characteristics of stability or the role of individual firms.
In a systematic attack on the theory's population ecology dynamics, Donaldson (1995) suggests that by overlooking sociological or organizational variables in favor of environment the theory merely cultivates a posture of opposition to alternative views about adaptation. Accordingly, the theory is open to suggestions that organizational survival may result from any number of organizational characteristics. Building this perspective, he argues that "organizations that die are not necessarily misfitted to their environments…it follows that there is no evidence that population adaptation through births and deaths is as important as adaptation by [and within] individual organizations " (1995: 62) . Like Bartunek's (1984) study of a religious order, he goes on to argue that organizational survival or failure may result from a multitude of organizational characteristics other than those suggested by structural inertia theory, and that as a result, Hannan and Freeman's thesis is too antagonistic.
Other critiques of structural inertia theory follow a similar path. Although inertia theory is built on norms or procedural rationality generated from demographic and population ecology, individuals and individual organizations also influence inertia choices, such as the routines that characterize inertia theory (Amburgey et al., 1993) . For example, in their study of how organizational routines coexist with change, Feldman and Pentland (2003) highlight that routines embody both structure and agency, as organizational members reinforce and reproduce structures.
Tangentially, Petersen and Koput (1991) acknowledge that it is easier to focus on survival at the aggregate level of the population because of the way that inertia theory is construed around populations. After all, given its ecology assumptions, inertia focuses upon the gross aspects of the organization's external environment -that population adaptation through births and deaths explains organizational survival. Such criticism highlights that inertia theory is overwhelmingly influenced by the laws of population dynamics. As such, it lacks foresight because it ignores the combined strength of internal organizational characteristics such as organizational structure, administrative systems, management practices, and cultural or social patterns that are not aligned with populations.
The Logic of Structural Inertia
Noting the preceding two debates (support and challenge to structural inertia), inertia theory may seem blurred. On one hand, structural inertia is explained as the most rational, most agreeable means of survival in reaction to change. Yet on the other, it is described as empirically and conceptually problematic. So, what exactly is the logic of structural inertia?
Logic refers to a system of reasoning or an ability to reason, according to guiding principles (Oxford English Dictionary). In the structural change domain this reasoning encompasses the "principles encoded in the minds of those who create organizations" (Drazin et al., 2004: 163) , representing the underlying cognitive glue that lends meaning to organizations. This outlook fortifies George and Jones's (2001) judgment that understanding inertia is rooted to individual and group cognitive and affective sensemaking, and interpretation processes. Given that structural inertia theory shows organizations to be under increasing internal and external pressure to indicate that their actions are the result of a rational decision process, the logic of structural inertia entails a regression towards the mean when experiencing uncertainty or change. Organizations and their members strive for predictability. Numerous accounts have previously explained the varying reactions that this drive initiates including Kerr's (1975) explanation of the folly of reward systems, and Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) discussion of the effects of limited heuristics on judgment making. In each case, logic establishes the nature of organization, shaped and constituted by the reasoning attributed to deep-seated interpretive schemes, and by values and interests.
The logic of deliberate structural inertia is how organizational members develop and confirm beliefs and rules, create, break, and recreate routines, and validate schemata, in generating an inertia reaction in response to change (supported by Ranson et al, 1980; Sandelands and Stablien, 1987; Walsh, 1995) . To understand such logic, structural inertia can be conceptualized as a typology of four broad approaches, as depicted in Figure 1 . This typology builds on the cognitive components embedded in change in recognizing that organizational structure cannot be decoupled from an understanding of behavior and cognition (Gavetti, 2005) . It acknowledges that greater commitment to one goal can lead to decreased accessibility of alternative goals (Johnson et al., 2006) and how collective beliefs and interpretations influence actions (Porac et al., 2002; Weick, 1979) . Its source is Newell's (1990) theory of human cognition which acknowledges that humans are knowledge systems and symbol systems who attempt to respond to the variability around them.
The typology's vertical dimension describes motivation for structural inertia. It consists of the two schemes described earlier: (a) Motivated structural inertia refers to deliberate structural inertia that involves a planned intervention arising under certain organizational and environmental conditions. It entails the conscious creation and reinforcement of norms and routines, which are intrinsic features of inertia theory (after Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Feldman and Pentland, 2003) . Given that "individuals or groups with power to identify particular performances as "routine" have the power to turn exceptions into rules and thus, to enact the organization in ways they think appropriate" (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 110) , this structural inertia scheme is usually initiated at the senior manager level. This type of enactment draws on the declarative memory or knowledge that underlies human performance in tasks. (b) Unmotivated structural inertia assumes that organizations are automatically relatively inert, for which adaptive responses may be difficult and hazardous. It depicts structural inertia as an unplanned risk management process which, following from Simon (1967) , may be unconsciously imbued and monitored. Lord and Levy (1994) refer to such a reaction as a form of unconscious self-regulation by which some information processing occurs outside awareness. Matching inertia theory, the scheme views structural inertia as a consequence, rather than an antecedent, of changes happening in and around the organization. Unlike motivated inertia, it portrays planning as constraining potential structural change options.
The typology's horizontal dimension describes the conditions that prompt an organization to respond to change. This comparison draws upon the basic dichotomy already established in structural inertia critique (above). It is made up of (c) internal conditions which are internal organizational characteristics such as organizational structure, administrative systems, management practices, and cultural or social patterns, and (d) external conditions, which are the ecological features most usually associated with structural inertia theory, namely environmental factors outside the firm.
The four approaches to inertia unfold according to how different schemes and conditions come together to determine different inertia outcomes. Typically, structural inertia theory concentrates attention on unmotivated/external (UE) and motivated/external (ME) approaches because they encompass the basic ecological features that underpin Hannan and Freeman's (1984) thesis. For instance, Amburgey et al.'s (1993) account of inertia in Finnish newspaper organizations illustrates ME, while Singh et al.'s (1986) study of voluntary social service organizations highlights UE. The primary choice of using one approach over the other resides in the different roles that senior managers take in interpreting the organization and its changes (and therefore following a motivated or unmotivated path). ME necessitates strategic level managers (Daft and Weick, 1984) Conversely, unmotivated/internal (UI) and motivated/internal (MI) approaches are far rarer because they concentrate on the internal features of structural inertia that is a noticeably weak part of or overlooked in theorizing (as above). The primary choice of one over the other draws on Anderson's (1983) human cognitive architecture theory in defining the different ways that information is processed during change. People tend to interpret and cognitively process input data based on an internalized set of goals (Lant, 2002) . Such interpretation can be explicit, conscious, and reliant on declarative memory, or embedded, subconscious, and subject to production memory (i.e., the outcome of matching working memory to the situation).
Traditionally, the nature of cognitive research and its focus on symbolic architectures has meant that inertia discussion is likely to discuss UI approaches (Fiol, 2004; Johnson et al., 2006) . For instance, the UI approach cultivated by cultural norms and structures at Barings Bank helped facilitate the institution's demise. While Nick Leeson was widely blamed as the rogue trader who caused the Barings Bank collapse (Hunt and Heinrich, 1996) , his actions were facilitated by the way that bank structures and routines created and maintained conditions that allowed Leeson's actions. Bank officials knew of and habitualized centuries-old established operational and social routines despite the recognized cultural and operational differences between the London and the Singaporean offices, and despite trader ability to operate in ways that undermined organizational convention. Together, these items allowed Leeson to hide the trading losses that eventually brought the bank down. Given a proclivity for UI (after Donaldson, 1995; Drazin et al., 2004 ), the stratified model that follows describes and interprets the dynamics within an MI approach.
MODELLING DELIBERATE STRUCTURAL INERTIA
The model (Figure 2 ) explains the logic of deliberately promoting structural inertia when organizations undertake change. It details how individual and group knowledge effects this deliberate action. The model indicates how organizational members first instill principles of structural inertia (layer 1), and based on this initial reaction, how they enact these principles as choices (layer 2) and then validate structural inertia (layer 3). Unlike ecology literature's primary focus, the model addresses how this purposeful outcome occurs in the first instance. It attempts to explain the acknowledged paradox of such actions, rather than merely identify, rationalize, or address this approach to change. At its base is the premise:
Proposition: Organizations undertaking change are more likely to converge towards structural inertia.
The foundation of such deliberate action is the belief and symbol systems that inform decision making. Belief systems comprise the collective, integrated beliefs that influence the interpretations and actions of organizational members (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Porac et al., 2002) . Symbol systems are the schematic representations that organizational members draw on or form inference to guide behavior (Newell and Simon, 1976) . Together they generate a body of knowledge which is used as a medium for action (to attain or to generate goals). Given that humans are learning entities who change as they interact and enact their environment (Lant, 2002; Walsh, 1995) , it is incumbent that inertia theory recognize how belief and symbols are affected by organizational members' values (Layer 1) and deep-seated interpretive schemes (Layers 2 and 3).
The precedent for using this coupling for the model comes from Ranson et al.'s (1980) argument for a unified approach to explain variations in structural arrangements, and Bartunek and Moch's (1987) suggestion that organizational development needs to address schemas and knowledge.
Layer One: Facilitating the Belief in Structural Inertia
The first layer of the model establishes the doctrine -the belief -for why structural inertia persists or can flourish during change. It deals with the values that organizational members hold and generates the internal motivation upon which deliberate inertia action is justified.
Recognizing that organizations only change through their members (George and Jones, 2001 ), organizational members imbue principles of inertia by creating, filtering, and processing knowledge and information which sustains such structures. Cognitive theory establishes that in an effort to increase the predictability of action and therefore, of results, members identify and draw on norms in converting this belief into allied behavior. In effect, norms act to regulate social behavior, reinforce members' roles, and justify power (Feldman, 1984) , facilitating the imposition of beliefs and symbols that reinforce inertia. This response takes the shape of knowledge structures -those mental templates that individuals impose on information to give it meaning (Walsh, 1995) . For example, early studies of the computerization of offices and factories (e.g., Barley, 1986; Zuboff, 1988) show how organizational members mediated change to instill inertia by drawing on knowledge of what the organization and their jobs were like before the technology.
Despite the potential benefits of new technology, using past experiences, socialization, and tradition, individuals imposed their views of change and rationally reasoned this action.
Consequently, this layer models the process of taking subjective knowledge about change and reviewing it in a manner that reaffirms inertia structures. In effect, individuals create knowledge structures to simplify their world and impose meaning to enable predictable action. Such a reaction is represented by the internal mental models that frame structural inertia options.
Mental models are a psychological representation of the environment and its expected behavior (Holyoak, 1984) whose role is to provide conceptual framework for describing, explaining, and predicting future states (Rouse and Morris, 1994) . They embody the "cognitive structures that represent organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus" (Fiske and Taylor, 1984: 140) . The purpose of mental models is to predict behavior because they are sources of human expectations. It is a knowledge structure that enables individuals to screen out information in order to manage uncertainty. When applied to structural inertia theory it offers an alternative to the ecological approach. Instead of concentrating on environment and strategic choice to deal with uncertainty, it asserts embedded schemata that individuals use to make sense of the world. For example, Porac and Thomas (1990) use mental models to illustrate how decision makers interpret competitive environments, while Shah et al. (2002) use them to understand how individuals self-regulate their behavior and inhibit alternative goals.
In theory, while organizational members can act as they like, unencumbered by the properties of social structures, in practice social and behavioral order exercises considerable influence over these individuals. The risk of relying on mental models to manage uncertainty, as Boudreau and Robey (2005) illustrate, is that some knowledge structures can limit an individual's ability to understand information. Their study of state government employees reveals that organizational members were so comfortable with the perceived benefits and processes of established systems and processes that it limited their capability to break old, less efficient work habits. It is this same potential liability, however, that enables deliberate structural inertia despite environmental selection pressures. This model layer, therefore, asserts that how organizations respond to change is contingent on individuals' imposed meanings as they monitor and interact with the internal environment.
Given that mental models in organizations are an aggregation of individuals' knowledge structures (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994) , they support an MI approach to inertia by the way that organizational members assess change stimuli. Organizational members draw on their expectations for change and tend to understand and remember things based on these expectations. This reaction represents the cognitive inhibition (i.e., bounded memory) and embedded habit of the stratified model. For example, an organization may have recently been purchased and its new owners decide to consolidate the various organizational departments. Organizational members react to this proposal based on their experience of previous change and process input data based on an internal set of motivations. In reaction to change ('our firm is merging departments'), members scan data ('this is good for me and my team'). They then impose meaning about the change by actively constructing reality. That is, they assess their initial assumption against what was initially expected or promised ('but wait, what about our team's central role in RandD? This change might not be so good after all'). Such schema fulminates itself into a response or action later ('let's fight this change', 'let's use this change').
Consequently, beliefs are inculcated by organizational members creating assumptions about or imagining organizational structure templates, which they then attempt to fit with or match to the realities around them. In keeping with theories of motivation and self-regulation (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Deci and Ryan, 1985) , these templates enable individuals to consciously validate knowledge. In the most extreme cases, the strength of these mental models means that data inconsistent with these templates can be rearranged to reinforce extant beliefs. As Gavetti's (2005) account of Polaroid's failure to become a market leader in digital photography shows, the entire process can occur because individuals are often more interested in confirming their beliefs than they are interested in trying to disprove them.
Yet individuals never have more than a fragmentary knowledge of conditions surrounding their action. They rely on oversimplified representations of a situation drawn from memory, habit, and positive stimuli that have a far greater influence than does environment or demographic characteristics. It is this imperfect knowledge that aided in the Challenger disaster (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) , and in Enron's collapse (McLean and Elkind, 2003) . Organizational members filter and process imperfect information through goal shielding, which is "the cognitive inhibition of alternative goals that compete for one's attentional resources" (Shah et al., 2002 (Shah et al., : 1261 . This mindset reduces the accessibility of alternative and competing goals as individuals strive for closure. So whereas organizations undertaking change can quite obviously encourage stability and simultaneously limit change, this cognitive inhibition can lead to seemingly well-justified imperfect rationalizing.
The first layer of the model therefore proposes a means of organizing prior knowledge in a way that enables individuals experiencing change to function, rather than being paralyzed by change. Differing from ecological approaches to inertia, and recognizing the influence of (conscious) beliefs -made up of perception, memory, and inference -on an individual's ability to understand organizational change, the layer offers a simple effect:
Proposition: Deliberate structural inertia during organizational change is more likely to occur if it is congruent with the mental models of organizational members.
Knowledge structures provide a guide to possible structural change choices. The content of these knowledge structures represent specific perceptions about institutional beliefs and constitute stocks of knowledge used to enable the features of structural inertia. They are made up of institutional norms and regulative order, drawn from declarative memory.
Given that groups and individuals rely on predictability and thus enforce norms that facilitate survival (Feldman, 1984) , behavioral norms establish the predictability that underpins deliberate structural inertia choices (in layer 2). Structural inertia is facilitated by how organizational members interpret the normative systems that introduce prescriptive and obligatory dimensions into organizational life. These contextual factors play a critical role in determining the degree to which cognitive inhibition and embedded habits take root in the organization. The organization instills in its members a set of common beliefs, based on shared behavioral values. For example, the way that organizational members use email is dependent on norms and social pressures that become internalized as standard behaviors. Is it acceptable for organizational members to email executive officers? Does the organization actively discourage the social use of email? These norms provide a basis for predictability, establishing behavioral boundaries and regulating roles and rules (Giddens 1984; Scott 2001) . This shared expectation becomes internalized as a guiding force informing individual reactions.
Behavioral norms coincide with the institutional order -those regulatory processes within an organization that maintain organizational values and embed organizational fields (Scott, 2001 ).
These processes include the rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities that characterize the organization. Deliberate structural inertia is grounded in an understanding of the relevance of its features to the organization. A key assumption of such a reaction is that individuals and groups are embedded in a structure built around the order of office. After all, in developing bureaucracy theory, Weber (1924 Weber ( /1968 stressed the importance of a legal order that consisted of a "system of consciously made rational rules" (p.953). For example, in a case study of Singaporean government hospitals Sia et al. (2002) illustrate that despite the ability of ERP systems to alter organizational tasks and transactions, most hospital sites did not undertake such change due to the pressures of existing rules, expectations, power, and protocols. The belief in the legal sanction of institutional regulation ensures that organizational members regulate and routinize their behavior.
Conversely, social pressures can also act to inform the choices behind deliberate structural inertia. The prevalent social order encompasses the schemata or symbolic representations of the world that define an individual's knowledge about the organization and their place in it, and therefore the way that they interpret change. One on hand, this reaction encompasses role schema, which are the cognitive structure that individual's use to organize knowledge about appropriate behavioral norms and institutional order (Fiske and Taylor, 1984) . These roles are often prone to stereotyping, with certain behaviors and standards expected of certain people (e.g., executive and subordinate), having clear affective and behavioral consequences. On the other, social order depicts the symbols that organizational members translate in coming to understand the world around them and the organization they exist within. Through these symbols (e.g., language, office space, title) individuals build internal mental models from which they form inferences about organizational characteristics and operations (e.g., culture). The resultant inferences feeds into memory so that an organizational member draws on historical information and previous categorizations when reacting to change (hence the 'but we've always done it this way' reaction to change). Given that people regularly construe information in ways that confirm their general expectations (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Porac et al., 2002; Walsh, 1995) , social order enables a belief in structural inertia despite the sophistication of changes taking place. The potency of social order is that it becomes self-reinforcing, making it difficult for individuals to imagine acting very differently or to envision fundamental changes to organizational activities. 
Proposition

Layer Two: Enacting Structural Inertia Choices
The second layer of the model deals with the process of evaluation and interpretation, as organizational members give meaning to mental models. It details how the embedded, taken-forgranted, and emergent templates of the previous layer are converted into opinion or possible choices about structural inertia features.
Whereas layer one related how individuals draw on belief to make a judgment about the validity of structural inertia, drawing on affect theory (Fiske, 1981) , this layer shows how organizational members translate mental models into possible inertia options (i.e., fitting judgment to the schema they have previously constructed). Such conversion is either explicit and conscious, or embedded and subconscious as it is made on the basis of organizational member's evolving understanding of the situation. This part of the model thereby illustrates the conversion of intent into (deliberate) action.
Such conversion depicts a funnel effect. In meteorology and landscape ecology, wind blowing against mountain barriers tends to flatten out and go around or over them. If the barrier is broken by a pass or a valley, the air is forced through the break at considerable speed. This outcome is known as a funnel effect based on how it narrows and forces air flow (Cantwell and Foreman, 1993) . Similarly, in contrast to unmotivated approaches to inertia (UI/UE), assuming that individuals are boundedly rational, inertia belief (Layer 1) is funneled into core structural inertia features (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) by the strength of social routine influence on inertia choices. Social routines constitute the predictable, persistent, constantly repeated, and prevailing socially constituted rules, roles, characteristics, governance programs, and patterns of activity typical of structural inertia.
These social routines represent what Drazin and Sandelands (1992) refer to as the rules that govern actions and interactions of individuals. Drawing on an earlier example (above), if an organization had a strictly enforced policy of not allowing personal emails at work, and social routines instill this protocol, behavior is funneled into a bounded 'no-use' reaction. In a study of email usage, Markus (1994) illustrates this effect, showing how user's wish to manage how they were perceived led to using email to avoid unwanted social interactions and negative outcomes. This process of justifying structural inertia choices represents a way of how organizational members enact the core features of structural inertia from intangible knowledge structures into concrete choices. Because organizational members have reflective self-awareness of their roles, they can consciously legitimize their inertia choices through their actions (e.g., abide by social routines). Multiple studies confirm how such sensemaking creates the reality as it is experienced by organizational members (e.g., Bartunek, 1984; Fiol, 1994; Weick and Roberts, 1993) .
Through this meaning creation, social routines enable structural inertia to "thicken and harden…[so that] it becomes real in an ever more massive way" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 76 ). An example of this process is in how Enron's executives enacted their belief about the way the firm did business into its California energy strategy (McLean and Elkind, 2003) . With the deregulation of the State's energy sector, Enron began trading electricity in ways that it could not 1 It is at this stage of the model that organizational members could rationalize and disconfirm their mental models about structural inertia, leading to a rejection of layer one and ultimately, of deliberate inertia. This action would necessitate more attention on population ecology inertia effects -such as ME and UE approaches (Figure 1 ). Given the focus of this paper, however, this choice is not explored here. deliver, pushing prices up, and forcing the State to buy electricity from Enron's own supply utility. For instance, in 2000 it sold to the State power and other services that it did not have as reserves, with the expectation that Enron would never be called upon to supply (which it eventually was). Enron also exported power from California and brought it back at an inflated price when the State needed it. The company manipulated the market, creating supply shortages and simultaneously seeking government concessions for the same supply. By rewarding the vicepresident (Tim Belden) managing this tactic and publicly promoting the strategy as a success, Enron converted its corporate belief about profit and how it did business into institutionalized rules, roles, and attitudes. These same rules eventually helped bring down the company.
Such translation of belief represents an objectification process (after Berger and Luckmann, 1966) . Objectification denotes how subjective knowledge about the organization is converted into a routine pattern of everyday organizational life. Having created meaning in the form of mental models, organizational members now objectify structural inertia choices. It depicts a means of sensemaking whereby a common set of beliefs are mandated as taken-for-granted or as fact.
Deliberate structural inertia relies on these routines because they constitute an ordered, accepted reality. Organizational members learn constitutive rules of how to behave in a specific context and how these behaviors will be interpreted by others. They thereby consciously tailor their actions.
The resultant social routines become self-reinforcing, maintaining perceived favorable conditions (Gavetti, 2005; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . For example, Howard-Grenville (2005) shows that routines during change are sought after behavioral and performance controls as organizations embed goals in routine. Subsequently, the more experienced and comfortable organizational members become with a particular action, the more likely they are to repeat that action, institutionalizing social routines. As Hirsch observes, organizational behavior is driven by understandings that become ingrained in and synonymous with the organization "that comprise the set of taken-for-granted assumptions that constitute normalcy" (1997: 1715). Traditionally, the features that make up social routines initiate the accountability and reliability that act as an organizational deadweight in structural inertia theory.
Proposition: Deliberate structural inertia during change is linked to how mental models are converted into social routines.
Social routine is manifest this way facilitated by a process of reflective consciousness (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) . Organizational members respond to change by "continually reconstruct[ing] their view of the past in an attempt to understand the causal conditioning of the emergent present, while using this understanding to control and shape their responses in the arising future" (1998: 968/9). Deliberate structural inertia takes place because organizational members -most often managers -consciously choose to retain or to strengthen objectified social routines. Faced with a series of change options, organizational members seek alternatives that will satisfy a target goal. Consequently, they instill social routines that facilitate inertia choices, as they confront the emergent situation that change offers.
The objectification of social routine also represents the way that organizational members draw on acknowledged organizational conditions -past institutional properties -to inform current inertia choices. Organizational members consciously control and intentionally internalize mental models to create rules and use resources to strengthen established social routines. Through this scheme, routinized habit and repetition become embedded in future states. Social routine is viewed as a stabilizing influence on the organization, regardless of the sophistication of the change taking place. Humans have internal conscious states -free will, and reflexivity -that allow us to be aware of our surroundings and to think strategically about what we are going to do. This consciousness serves to allow control over certain processes, the implementation of intents, and the exercise of choice. Many of these decisions are often automatic, occurring effortlessly and mindlessly when making choices or taking action, thereby becoming encoded in the organization and its future decisions.
Proposition: Reflective consciousness is a source of deliberate structural inertia reaction to change.
Notwithstanding the potential of change, individuals with direct exposure to an organization undertaking changes often adopt a defensive reasoning in rationalizing their reactions (the 'we've always done it this way' syndrome). The objectification of social routines results in organizational members looking for the 'known' -which often encompasses the core features of structural inertia. They search for the sameness or likeness of the change experience with past experiences, and match their actions accordingly. Given that organizational members are only able to selectively focus attention on a small area of reality (Bargh et al., 2001) , they routinely rely on habitual interactions in order to fit the present to the past (e.g., Markus's (1994) account of email use, above). This action "provides actors with more or less reliable knowledge of social relationships, which allows them to predict what will happen in the future" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998 : 980/1). It is this search for predictability that facilitates the conversion of subjective mental models about structural inertia into objectified choices, allowing deliberate structural inertia to be consciously instilled. This sentiment seems counter-productive. Yet at its most basic level it reflects both the force of belief (layer one) and the drive organizational members have for predictability and certainty, particularly when faced with change.
Proposition: Deliberate structural inertia may be sustained by organizational member need for predictability and certainty during change.
Layer Three: Validating Structural Inertia
The third layer of the model indicates the judgment that organizational members make in confirming a belief in structural inertia. This affirmation is an outcome of how organizational members subjectively interpret and filter structural inertia choices.
Previous structural inertia research mostly concentrates on how inertia develops (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) and on addressing the processes through which structural convergence and reorientation occurs (Pettigrew, 1987) . Noting the model's focus on facilitating deliberate inertia, this layer deals with how interpretation of information from the previous two layers informs decisions about the type and extent of structural inertia adopted. In effect, this affirmation mimics a refreezing phase of change whereby mental models are solidified and inertia options or choices become 'frozen' through the enactment of social routine. This learning process results in the prominence of the different core parts of organization that typify inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . Traditionally, structural inertia has been shown to adjust itself continually across a continuum of high to low inertia types. (Dobrev, 1999; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan et al., 2004) . Similarly, the confirmation process results in different types of deliberate inertia based on the extent to which senior executive members validate inertia choices. Validation endorses the deliberate promotion of structural inertia because it strengthens the view that inertia is a consciously determined, logical, and legitimate organizing option, rather than only as an automatic or adaptive reaction to change. This validating process draws deliberate structural inertia farther away from the selection that is the basis of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) thesis.
Validation is based on the strength of top manager biases and commitments that influence interpretations (i.e., where decision making usually takes place). At its source, the process of deliberate structural inertia is reliant on (social routine generated) biases which skewer an assessment of the need for inertia during change. With an established belief in and then commitment to structural inertia (Layers 1 and 2), individual organizational members consciously confirm structural inertia as a legitimate means of organizing, and judge it and its outcomes favorably. This type of deliberate action is confirmed in Greiner and Bhambri's (1989) case study of a new CEO's intervention in strategic change, where specific personal values and changes were gradually validated as new strategy.
While this graduated validation confirms the rational nature of structural inertia theory (Amburgey et al., 1993) , it also establishes structural inertia as an internally-sourced, rationally justified appraisal. This outlook contrasts with ecology-based inertia theory. Deliberate structural inertia is logically justified by the way that organizational members judge change and not by the existence of environmental pressures or inertia features alone. At this stage of decision making, the activation of inertia behavior is based on the convergence of perceptual constructs, making the confirmation of a belief in structural inertia a widely-held expectation. Hence the negative feedback loop at layer 2 in the model (Figure 2 ) -without confirmation of inertia choices, the proactive interpretation at layer 3 would not proceed.
While individuals in organizations come and go, organizations preserve institutional knowledge, behaviors, mental maps, and norms over time (Daft and Weick, 1984) . How organizational members translate these embedded cognitive systems and memories into action establishes how closely structural inertia choices mirror eventual action (i.e., deliberate inertia).
Ecology theory acknowledges this subjectivity but chooses to concentrate instead on the external conditions that generate uncertainty and that need to be structurally managed (Baum and Shipilov, 2006) . The individual is a bit part player in the process of organizational failure and founding. By focusing on the internal mechanisms of inertia choice, the filtering reaction aligns individual decision maker biases and organizational attributions. Accordingly, it takes into account Hannan and Freeman's (1989) recognition that the actions of individuals can play a significant role in the type of inertia, even if this role has been undermined or ignored in subsequent theorizing.
Structural inertia during change is reliant on the conversion of these meanings and their allied choices into acts of organizing. It is this subjective reasoning alignment that explains how some organizations can act upon the same inertia stimuli differently (e.g., MI versus ME approaches).
For instance, reacting to market inertia in the airline industry, smaller and niche carriers such as Eos and Southwest Airlines have adopted markedly different high and low service strategies to that of established, older airlines. As Thomas and McDaniel (1990) illustrate, when exposed to the same stimuli, subjective constructs cause different organizations to respond differently. These subjective biases come from schema, a priori theories, past actions, beliefs, and procedures that influence perceptions about current issues. This retained set of beliefs provides a framework for deciding how to interpret situations and data and for deciding what action to take. It recognizes that most people make judgments under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) leading to inference and assumption. In this sense, the way that inertia choices are interpreted determines the type and extent of deliberate structural inertia.
While organizational members are nominally rational and systematic processors of information, it is more likely that they are limited in their ability to process information, and are biased because of a reliance on categorization and procedure (Bargh, 1984) . It is how organizational members use this limited understanding that further differentiates deliberate structural inertia from ecology-based inertia theory. Historically, limited understanding leads to a failure to consider all relevant information when making judgments or coming to a decision (Fiol, 2002) . This lack is the basis of many inertia outcomes (e.g., Drazin and Sandelands, 1992; Greiner and Bhambri, 1989) . For example, whereas after cultivating its core innovation competencies, Polaroid had a prototype digital camera ready to go to market in 1992, it waited until 1996 to release the product, by which time 40 other firms were selling digital cameras (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . Despite top management's deeply infused beliefs about technology and the firm's distinctive competencies allowing it to develop the necessary knowledge for competing in digital imaging, the limited transfer of these beliefs became the source of inertia.
Conversely, deliberate structural inertia during change is an outcome of the consciously processed risk management of change.
Using Tripsas and Gavetti's (2000) argument for the cognitive basis of inertia, the translation of subjective knowledge about the organization into tangible deliberate inertia action follows Bargh's (1984) conscious processing causal chain. This chain plots cause and effect whereby different priming stimuli (i.e., change) result in the conscious activation of different relevant categories (i.e., L1, L2), which generates a judgment outcome (i.e., deliberate structural inertia).
Given that "all judgment tasks ultimately refer to entire sets of objects, rather than isolated stimuli" (Upshaw, 1984: 245) , deliberate structural inertia is an outcome of the cumulative evaluation of organizational attributions by organizational members about inertia during change (i.e., L1 = L2 = L3). Because inertia is not necessarily a negative feature of change, executive organizational members must develop an understanding of the connections between mental model choices and organizational outcomes, and between information about the organization and its environment, in order to efficiently manage the process. In this sense, the third layer of the model is an outcome of learning as organizational members judge norms and ideologies based on their subjective understanding. This distorted learning is unique to each organization, giving rise to different types of high/low inertia. Such differences might explain divergences in findings in previous studies that test similar inertia environments (e.g., Singh et al., 1991; Tucker et al., 1990, and Rao and Neilson, 1992; Haveman, 1992) .
Proposition: The more aware organizational members are of inertia choices and allied decisions, the greater the likelihood of deliberate structural inertia during change.
The existence of this causal chain is an outcome of how organizational members rationally filter their actions and decisions during change. That is, in seeking to maintain and restore the appearance of the rationality of their actions, members cognitively distort or re-evaluate choices and tasks. There are two ways to explain this filtering. First, given that individuals routinely filter incoming information and then make decisions based on those interpretations (Thomas et al., 1993) , threat-rigidity theory posits that in the face of threat, such as those from change, individuals tend to pursue routine activities. Threats or perceived threats result in restricted information, and consequently, well-established or familiar routines become the norm.
Through this fall-back position, organization members are more likely to simplify and reduce the alternatives that they consider in reacting to change. The type of information sought during change is more likely to be based on prior knowledge and similar to that of the past, confirming choices made. Although a negative reading of the validation of structural inertia, this reaction confirms how the core features of structural inertia are reinforced despite evolving environments and opportunities during change.
Second, allied with this threat reaction, in seeking to retain the appearance of the rationality of structural inertia choices during change, organizational members tend to cognitively distort outcomes in their favor, as prescribed by escalation of commitment theories (Staw, 1976 (Staw, , 1981 .
Social cognition theory suggests that individuals consciously search for cues to further verify information in support of already made decision-making choices (Bargh, 1984) . One source of the motivation for this reaction may be a desire to appear rational. After all, "self-justification…or dissonance theory posits that individuals possess a potent need to restore the 'appearance' of rationality to their own behavior [and will] cognitively re-evaluate decisional alternatives after an important choice or actively distort the characteristics of a behavioral task" (Staw, 1976: 40) .
Subsequently, organizational members may appear to not respond as expected to the changes taking place within or around it, conditioned and bounded by subjective biases. This filtering was evident in how Enron's President, Jeffrey Skilling, committed the company to spend billions of dollars on transcendent business ideas with the idea of making real profit in the future based on the alignment with his belief. His commitment to growth knew no bounds, in alignment with the company's mantra and culture. Through ventures such as Enron Energy Services (providing electricity, gas, and energy management directly to businesses and homes) and Enron's broadband business, rational filtering resulted in Enron spending money that it did not have, simultaneously raising what would prove to be dire expectations about performance, because of Skilling's escalating commitment to his ability to convert belief into business (McLean and Elkind, 2004) .
Proposition: The more organizational members filter their actions and decisions during change, the greater the momentum for sustaining deliberate structural inertia.
This causal chain highlights structural inertia as an outcome of the interpretative confirmation of orthodoxy and embedded routines, rather than just the selection processes of inertia theory.
Validating structural inertia is therefore both a subjective (P8) and a consciously aware (P5, P7) means of situational sensemaking, based on the strength of beliefs that are embedded in routines.
DISCUSSION
This paper develops a conceptual model to explain the logic of deliberately promoting structural inertia when organizations undertake change. It responds to criticism of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) inertia theory by focusing on the internal influences that generate structural inertia. Structural inertia is often regarded in change theory as an organizational pathology in favor of a contemporary interest with change (Peli et al., 2000; Greenwood and Hinings, 2006) . Nonetheless, accepting that inertia is simultaneously embedded in change highlights an accepted paradox: organizations change their structures but do so infrequently; structural inertia is a rational reaction to change. Moving away from a population ecology explanation of this phenomenon, the paper elaborates upon the value of considering the logic of why organizations deliberately initiate structural inertia. This logic is helpful given that ecology based explanations of structural inertia considers change to be largely unpredictable and emergent, and therefore primarily dependent on external influences. By centering attention on internal influences and relationships, the model addresses widely acknowledged problems with and subsequent tests of Hannan and Freeman's (1977) original theory. The logic of deliberate structural inertia is how organizational members develop and confirm beliefs and rules, create and break routines, and validate schemata in generating an inertia reaction in response to change. This paper provides several interesting avenues for empirical and theoretical consideration.
Reconciling the Role of the Individual in Structural Inertia
In its theoretical review this paper notes the criticism that structural inertia theory depends heavily on an external focus of causality in explaining organizational survival. By focusing on the influence of the organizational member and on individual cognition we can benefit from joining ecology theories with established theories of individual change in organizations. This association can be used to enhance the explanatory power of structural inertia theory. Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) have previously provided a good example of this type of 'productive theory building' (George et al., 2006) , bringing together capabilities, cognition, and inertia theories to explain the difficulties of organizational change.
While not a cognitive theory piece, by invoking this body of literature, the paper attempts to broaden structural inertia theory by connecting it to cognitive research. In doing so, it elaborates on George and Jones's (2001) finding that organizational structure cannot be decoupled from an understanding of individual cognition and behavior. Focusing on explaining the logic rather than the process or sources of structural inertia, the model (and its typology basis and parts) expands upon their conclusion in explaining how organizational members may logically impede structural change. It does so in extending an explanation of the role of knowledge structures in inertia theory. This focus recognizes the general acceptance that Hannan and Freeman's (1984) inertia theory can be interpreted at both the population and individual organization levels (Donaldson, 1995; Peli et al., 2000) . While the study of individual cognition is well over half a century old (Walsh, 1995) , and an explanation of how information processing can be both enabling and crippling is still perplexing given how organizations strive for predictability (Baum and Shipilov, 2006) , the model draws on these views to examine the issues that describe, explain, and predict an inertia state.
The model both complements and contrasts previous work of how structural inertia is entrenched in individual cognition. Paralleling Drazin et al. (2004) in suggesting that structure is an entity that exists and is constructed in the mind of organizational members, and Johnson et al.'s (2006) recognition that individual's consciously organize information and activate knowledge structures to achieve organizational end states, the model links cognition to individual behavior which informs institutional behavior. This outlook emphasizes the cognitive biases that shape organizational responses to change, recognizing how inertia theory has been transformed since Hannan and Freeman's original thesis. Researchers have increasingly focused their attention on processes of organizational-level change and tests of structural inertia theory (Baum and Amburgey, 2002) . Conversely, explaining deliberate structural inertia using cognition adds a dimension to ecology research in confirming that individuals, in addition to an organization's environment, change organization structures. The implication of this view is that organizational ecologists need to more readily acknowledge how the processes inside organizations affect, interact, and overlap with organizational environments and populations. This observation suggests that structural inertia is a nested outcome of change with individual trends embedded within organizational trends. In future research scholars can build on this approach.
In contrast, the theory of the logic of deliberate structural inertia -the MI approach of the typology (Figure 1 ) -suggests distinctively different conclusions to those theorists arguing for the rationality of inertia. Hannan and Freeman (1989) propose that inertia is built on norms of rationality. Several sets of researchers have used this assumption in explaining inertia and its accompanying ecological conditions (e.g., Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989; Peli et al., 2000) . The net result is the pigeonholing of inertia as a manifestation of rational, natural selection processes in reaction to and as an action of change. Conversely, the model suggests that in deliberately promoting structural inertia, organizational members may not necessarily do so rationally -at least as ecology research defines rationality. The logic of this deliberate action is that it resides in how belief and interpretation influences actions. This reaction is logically deduced by organizational member response to inertia and change.
If logic encompasses the reasoning that acts as the basis of predictability, and if it is rooted to principles in the mind of the individual (Drazin et al., 2004) , the model illustrates that the way its different layers connect represents the potential for different types of structural inertia.
Organizational theory exemplifies rational inertia as bounded by neat boundaries (i.e., accountability, reliability, consistency). Yet the deliberate structural inertia actions undertaken in one organization may differ from another and may even be viewed as illogical by others. For instance, prior to its failure in the digital imaging market, Polaroid's decision to concentrate on instant photography seemed logical to the firm, based on cognitively influenced logic (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . Deliberate structural inertia cannot be decoupled from an understanding of how individual beliefs and interpretations influence actions. This idea is reinforced by work by Denrell and March (2001) on risk aversion and individual attributions, and by Ranson et al. (1980) on the interaction of interpersonal cognitive processes and power dependencies during structural change.
Another area of future exploration could therefore include research on the overlapping institutional and cognitive biases that shape logic and the interpretative basis of deliberate structural inertia.
Situating the Model in Structural Inertia Dialogue
The understanding of what is successful structural change and how it is sustained is well established in the work of those testing and extending Hannan and Freeman's (1984) organizational ecology thesis. However, the model and its typology prompts a reassessment of what is successful structural change if change includes deliberately promoting inertia for reasons other than natural selection.
Examining the role of organizational members and providing a stratified model to explore this role might shed light on some of the contradictions about 'success' that exist in ecologists' writing. For instance, structural inertia theory asserts that existing organizations often have difficulty changing structure quickly enough to keep up with the pace of the demands of uncertain, changing environments. Organizational change therefore is regularly regarded as reflecting inert organizations replacing each other over time. This outlook minimizes the influence of individuals in favor of environmental determinism (albeit one that acknowledges internal constraints). Empirical explanations of organizational ecology regularly make this assertion (see Baum and Amburgey, 2002; Baum and Shipilov, 2006) . In doing so, they assess successful structural change as change to a more advantageous configuration.
Contemporary perspectives on organization promote change and success as allied forces (Greenwood and Hinings, 2006 ). Yet researchers increasingly focus their attention on and test failure in inertia theory. Given the dichotomy in inertia research that there is both an increased risk of failure and that some organizations become more fluid rather than structurally inert with age, failure is simultaneously discomforting and reassuring to change researchers. On one hand, opportunity and success are deeply embedded cultural values. On the other, failing is a virtue when used as a learning tool. The increasing popularity of a pro-change perspective in change theory progressively overlooks such balance. The stratified model adds to this debate showing change and failure to be influenced by subjective inertia choices. This view is informed by the recognition that structural inertia is a legitimate but subjective mechanism of an organization's adaptation to change.
Much like Burgelman's (2002) use of inertia as a learning device, and acknowledging that inertia encompasses momentum (Amburgey et al., 1993) , successful change should also include broader recognition of deliberate structural inertia. Mainstream organizational theory portrays organizations as equilibrium seeking entities attempting to balance oscillations and change. This paper offers an allied yet alternative view by suggesting that disequilibrium may be just as useful; unlike inertia theory, failure does not have to follow inertia. The model presents an interpretive scheme to understand deliberate structural inertia choices during change rather than to simply understand change. Consequently, it suggests that organizations react to change in distinctive ways because of the different types of subjective structural inertia influences initiated by enacting different inertia schemes and conditions. This enactment is a function of the influence of agency on norm-based action.
The nature of inertia theory's population-ecology basis has meant that most researchers who assess Hannan and Freeman examine inertia outcomes or isolate specific characteristics promoting inertia (Hannan et al., 2004) . By categorizing intentional structural inertia a part of an interpretive scheme, however, the model acknowledges such studies but specifies the mediating and moderating influence of framing choices and inertia decisions. Recognizing that organizations often change in unanticipated and inconsistent ways, this focus emphasizes the relevance of learning from human agency. While others have explored separately the enactment of inertia (e.g., Greve, 1999) or of agency (e.g., Boudreau and Robey, 2005) , few have combined the two. An empirical examination of the propositions presented in the paper could act as such an examination and assess the influence of agency on inertia outcomes.
Theoretical models such as the one in this paper often run the risk of appearing arbitrary and overly simplified in order to facilitate empirical testing (Greiner and Bhambri, 1989) . Similarly, studies dealing with cognitive processes are bounded by individual cognitive limitations and measurement problems (Johnson et al., 2006) . Given the difficulty of accurately studying and validating knowledge structures more attention needs to be accorded to studying the subjective experience associated with the model. Such attention acknowledges that to consciously regulate one's behaviors, evaluations, and decisions requires considerable effort and is relatively slow.
Multiple ways to measure this perception-validation link already exist in social psychology (see Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) and can act as the starting point towards more developed views of knowledge changes during organizational change. Our understanding of structural inertia must be grounded in a clear conceptualizing of information processing and structural inertia outcomes. To facilitate this, the propositions in this paper could be tested with data collected from strategic level managers (Daft and Weick, 1984) in single organizations or in a single industry that is undertaking or has recently undergone a major organizational change such as instituting new procedures or new interventions. Alternatively, propositions could be tested with scenario testing such as the case-scenario methodology used by Thomas et al. (1993) or the experiment scenarios used by Bargh et al. (2001) .
CONCLUSION
When confronting change, organizations initiate a series of structural responses that include deliberately promoting structural inertia. This paper has integrated structural inertia theory, change theory, and cognitive theory to suggest how internal organizational processes render this deliberate action. Notwithstanding the strength of change, the extent of all change is inherently embedded in deep-seated social and relational systems that organizational ecologists should understand better. Structural inertia is a fundamental characteristic of organization and should be studied in as much depth at the individual level as at the organizational level. By exploring the logic of deliberate structural inertia choices this paper provides a stimulus for such research. 
